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Congressional Record S. 7381, Military Selective Service Act, Troop Withdrawal

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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that, despite the changing world, those policies are just as good and just as effective today.

I had a part in setting up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—a minor part, because I served in the House of Representatives at that time—but there are others here—I cannot name them all—Senator Aiken, Senator Young, Senator Ellender, Senator Anderson, Senator McClellan, and others, who were in this Chamber when the great debate occurred 21 years ago which, on the basis of a congressional resolution, called for an increase of from two to six divisions in Europe.

There was a question raised at that time as to how long they would be there, and I think the answer was "Not very long; a few years."

As a matter of fact, I think it was Senator Robert Taft who raised that question in committee. But what we are faced with now, in my opinion, is not only the possibility of an indeterminate stay of 525,000 U.S. military personnel and dependents, but maybe a permanent stay.

Why should not the Europeans want us to maintain this large force? Why should they not want us to send our surplus generals and colonels there? Why should they not want us to continue to carry the greatest share of the burden—not alone in our defense, but primarily in their defense?

They are better off by far than this country. If my memory serves me correctly, our debt is equal to the combined debts of all the other countries in the world. We have an unemployment rate of 6.1 percent and an inflation rate of 5.7 percent. That is today. And I do not want to look over my shoulder and think that something that was good 20 or 25 years ago cannot necessarily undergo a change today.

I am not a member of the old guard. There is a chronological gap between me and the great majority of the people of this Nation who are under 30 years of age, but there never will be a credibility gap if I can help it, because I want to join them in facing up to the world of reality of today, and I do not want to live in the past. I do not want to return to the "gold old days." I want to face up to the responsibilities which are ours, individually and collectively, today.

Does the Senate want to do something about this situation in NATO? I think it does. I know it does. But the question is, will the Senate do something about this situation, which we all know calls for correction and which we all know will not be hidden under a shroud forever? Not from this week on.

It was interesting to read the report of the Committee on Armed Services, now on Senators' desks, and on page 35 to find this item, under the heading: "Army":

Second, there is some reason to believe that there may be an excessive number of supply and logistics personnel in the U.S. Army forces in Europe. The Defense Department has itself recently conducted a review of these units and has reduced authorized strength in them by several thousand. But the Committee—

That is the Armed Services Committee, which is in control of the bill now before us—

believes there could be room for some further reductions. The detailed material in this area is highly classified but it should be noted that the United States cannot be expected to maintain a large supply and logistics base in Europe to support hostilities for a long period of time when our allies are showing, by their stores of supplies and ammunition, that they do not intend to maintain the logistics base necessary for such lengthy hostilities.

That is the end of the quotation from the report accompanying the bill now before the Senate for its consideration.

Mr. President, the Senate confronts an issue of immense importance. The outcome may well affect this Nation's posture not only with regard to Europe but also, to a great extent, to its role around the globe. In a very real sense, the Senate is today looking to the years ahead and to the policies and positions that will be relevant and productive. To be sure, what was done in the past was relevant and productive. But the time has come, in my judgment, to strike a course that will free us from certain shackles forged originally to bind us to policies and positions that have lost their meaning.

In cutting by one-half the level of U.S. forces in Europe, the amendment is designed to put U.S. troop levels there into a contemporary perspective. Needless to say, I have been impressed by the intensity of comment which this proposal has prompted. It is a healthy sign of interest in our European policies—policies which have indeed suffered great neglect during these past several years of turbulence in Southeast Asia.

At the outset, I would like to note my respect for the array of statesmen who have spoken out on this matter. Many of them, in my opinion, will be judged exceedingly well by history. It was 20 years ago, in a time of ominous cold war tension, that many of them forged the powerful shield behind which West European recovery was allowed to proceed securely. Their voices spoke then to a world still shaken in the wake of a long and devastating war. Their voices have been revitalized today, Mr. President. But the world they address is quite different.

Europe's economic and social recovery has been remarkable; many of its members are in a stronger position than we, and all are capable of doing far more than their present effort if they really believe their security is in danger.

We no longer perceive a monolithic Communist bloc arrayed solidly against us.

China and Russia now present the greatest threat to each other's security.

The Iron Curtain has parted in many places, and relations between East and West Europe are rapidly improving.

I cite these as a few examples of change. In spite of the changes, however, our NATO commitment of force today is not substantially less than when the Alliance was entered 20 years ago. Indeed, considering the awesome might of our tactical nuclear weaponry, it is far greater. One final thought on this, Mr.

THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, first let me thank all my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for the very kind words they have had to say about me.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, may we have order?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Especially at the beginning of their speeches, sometimes before, and sometimes toward the end, they told me they were going to vote against the pending amendment. I appreciate the good will and the good wishes.

Mr. President, sometimes it takes a sledge hammer to make an imprint and place an issue on the table. I did raise this issue. I have been raising it for 11 years. I did not make the issue this time. But the issue has been made, and regardless of the outcome of the vote tonight, it will not disappear. It will not return to the cobwebs where it has rested so peacefully for the past two decades and 1 year.

I shall try not to go back over what I have already said, because, while the debate has been considerate in part and emotional in part, in my opinion it has not been as practical as it might have been. There has been no hint of an understanding from downtown or from overseas. It was take it or leave it; and I am happy, speaking personally, that we are confronting this amendment on an up-and-down basis on the merits and unchanged. I have no regrets, no apologies, and no alibis, and I expect, at the very least, to achieve a minimum of that which I set out to attain. This matter now has been brought to the full attention of this administration as it was not in the previous Democratic administrations. This issue has now come to the attention of our NATO partners.

It has come to the attention of the peoples who together comprise the 15-Nation membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

What I have endeavored to do is to move from the past into the present, and to look to the future. What I have tried to do is not to look over my shoulder in order to hang on to policies which were good two decades ago, and think

President, I would just say that nostalgia for great achievements in the past cannot replace constructive approaches to a foreign policy designed for the future.

It should be clearly explained, first of all, that it is not suggested by this amendment that we let down our defenses or abandon Western Europe. It is only suggested that we not remain frozen in an unrealistic and outdated posture; one that serves only to weaken us as a Nation. It is suggested that at long last we face up to the matter of reducing to realistic proportions our garrison in Europe along the lines recommended 10 years ago by Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Oh, but the same voices are heard expressing the same reasons. First, they exclaim that the possibility of detente will be jeopardized. But what has improving East-West relations to do with the present bloated level of U.S. forces in Europe? What is to prevent us from relaxing tensions if the fat is squeezed out of the military garrison there? What has the precise figure of 300,000 U.S. military personnel along with their 225,000 dependents to do with easing tensions? Why not more? Why not less? Indeed, have not the West European nations done very well themselves in easing East-West tensions without much concern for the number of forces they have contributed to NATO? France has none. Germany has fewer than it pledged. The United Kingdom has cut to the bone, and Canada is well on her way out.

It all adds up to this Nation carrying a very one-sided financial burden for NATO long past the time when the burden of financial exchange shifted against us. In reply, it is said that the Europeans are making an effort. They are attempting to defray these balance-of-payments losses. It was stated that through agreements the Germans were purchasing quantities of U.S. equipment which, to a large degree, "offset" our expenditure in Germany. But the so-called "offset" program just does not withstand close scrutiny.

This policy, Mr. President, began in the early 1960's. Formal offset agreements have been in effect only between ourselves and West Germany, the recipient of the bulk of our NATO related expenditures. While the term "offset" is bandied about, it is understood that a substantial portion of the purchases are purchases which the Germans would have made here in the United States, anyway. In fact, it has been disclosed that in the beginning years of these arrangements, several weapons systems—a large portion of offset sales—had actually been contracted for prior to the Kennedy administration. This kind of "offset" is not my idea of a genuine extra effort which truly attempts to make up for our current heavy NATO burdens.

By 1967, I might add, we adopted the temporary expedient of medium term securities, which, of course, only deferred the problem of our outlays. Moreover, the accumulation of such loans will in time only result in further German claims against our financial stability.

The newest chapter, Mr. President, involves a European willingness to defray directly about \$200 million a year of our

NATO expenditures in Europe. I suggest that when such an agreement is consummated, the balance of payments outflow from NATO may well have reached \$2 billion. In this regard, the news on Monday about the first quarter balance-of-payments deficit is most alarming.

If one were really serious about insisting upon an equitable burden sharing within NATO, one would demand that our allies pick up the full amount of these expenditures, not a token 10 percent as is now mentioned. As has been pointed out, to reduce our real NATO budget, we need direct payments. Much more basic to the issue, however, is the fact that the idea of genuine burden sharing is but a pious hope. It was mentioned 20 years ago and has been talked about ever since. If burden sharing were the only issue here, then why not take congressional action with teeth in it; why not enact legislation that would require a full contribution from our allies? Let the European pocketbook determine how critically the Europeans view the presence of these 300,000 American servicemen with their 225,000 dependents.

Though exceedingly important in the context of this debate, money is not the only question at stake. There has been the modified Mathias proposal; the Nelson proposal, the Dominick proposal, the Bayh proposal, the Percy proposal, and others; some emerged, some emerging and perhaps some yet to emerge. Though to varying degrees, most of these alternatives recognized the necessity for change; none I say, most respectfully, were willing to make the adjustment in clear and direct fashion. Indeed, most called for less than what 50 or more of my colleagues in the Senate in the past have called upon the Executive to do—that is, to achieve a substantial reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. Most of the alternatives, be they perfecting amendments or substitute amendments, asked for consultations and negotiations. But we have consulted and we have negotiated this question year after year after year. There were calls, too, for progress reports by the President. But the President has reported. And progress has never proceeded. Time and time again we have admonished our allies to bear a fair share of the NATO burden; we have advised them about gaps in our planning assumptions and conventional forces; we have warned about the consequences if they were not prepared to pull their own car. I submit that most of these alternatives—as modified or otherwise—merely asked that we embark on several more years of fruitless negotiations. I submit that no action on our part will meet with allied approval, no matter how much consultation; no matter how much negotiation. We have already paid too big a price for delaying this question with negotiations and consultations.

And what have negotiations and consultations with the West Europeans wrought for our agricultural community? My colleagues in this Chamber representing agricultural States understand the problem only too well. It is simply time to indicate to the Europeans that we will stand firm for our interests;

all of our interests. But, no, they say any adjustment downward of our European garrison somehow affects adversely every other part of the globe.

Most notable is the warning that the amendment would impair the Middle East situation. I am frankly impressed with the sudden revelation to officials in the Government who for years have had difficulty seeing any serious Soviet threat to Israel. Suddenly they have seen the light and now urge opposition to the amendment because it allegedly would hinder our ability to aid Israel and would strengthen the Soviet hand in the Middle East.

Mr. President, this claim is just not supported. The key to our air capability in the Mideast, in turn, is not our Army in southern Germany. It is the airbases in Turkey, in Greece, and in Italy, for which we pay no small sums in terms of aid.

But finally, we are told that unilateral reduction of our NATO forces would doom prospects of a complementary reduction of Warsaw Pact armies. It is said that if the amendment were adopted we could "kiss that possibility goodbye."

Mr. President, that is just not so. Parroting it in one editorial or a hundred does not make it so. It is unfounded, first of all, to suggest that U.S. NATO troop reductions provide the exclusive incentive to East European troop reductions by the Soviets. It is no secret, for instance, that Russia's need to strengthen its forces in the Far East continues more than ever today. At the same time, Russia continues to follow us in the costly and ever spiraling strategic arms race. And, no less than we, are the Soviets aware of the demands made by their entire defense budget upon the domestic economy.

For all of these reasons—but primarily because of the tensions in the Far East—Moscow has a very great incentive indeed to reduce its Warsaw Pact forces and redeploy them eastward.

What makes the Russians hesitate? Clearly the dominant reason is the problem of political control in Eastern Europe. As Czechoslovakia revealed all too plainly, such control still rests ultimately on military might. If Soviet planners find their Far East concerns sufficiently pressing, some reduction in Eastern Europe no doubt would be risked. Otherwise such a reduction is unlikely under any circumstances.

So how does the size of NATO's army fit into this picture? I suggest, Mr. President, that cutting our Seventh Army forces is an equally reasonable way to induce the Soviets to reduce their manpower in the satellites. I suggest such a cut on our part would act as effectively to obtain this end as would any force reductions reached mutually through long drawn-out negotiations. It is clear, too, that with a substantial reduction of our NATO contingent, the willingness of Eastern Europe to tolerate an undiminished Soviet presence would be sharply reduced. Russia would be hard put to explain why it was necessary to retain such large forces to protect the satellites against a pruned-back NATO.

Indeed, it would not even be improbable to suggest that if one were a Soviet leader this past weekend, worried about the prospect of such satellite pressure, one might well have sought to defer any action on United States-European troop strength by calling for long, drawn-out negotiations.

Another factor in Soviet reluctance to reduce its forces may actually be its assessment of the NATO threat. Many Soviet experts argue persuasively that Russia's foreign policy remains a mixture of aggressive and genuinely defensive attitudes. To the extent that this, too, is a factor in Soviet reluctance to reduce its Warsaw forces, a unilateral reduction by the United States could be a positive factor in a Soviet willingness to make a suitable response.

But, it will be said by some, what of the deep fear of Western Germany? The argument goes that with a reduced restraining presence of American forces, Germany may seek to expand its own military power. It is this fear that would harden Russia's present position in Europe. This is pure speculation. Not only does it ignore the fact that Bonn has no financial stomach for substantial military enlargement, but it also denies the growing preeminence of West Germany in the Common Market and its desire to retain its strong ties to the West and its eagerness for trade ties with the East.

But even if I am wrong, that is no argument for hoping that simultaneous force reductions would result from negotiations. If in fact Soviet reluctance to reduce its forces is dominated by fear of a nuclear West Germany, unrestrained by our presence, then it will be no more anxious to reduce its position in Central Europe through mutual force reduction talks. If the real problem is fear of a nuclear West Germany, let us address that problem, and not talk about peripheral issues. In Southeast Asia we have learned too well the painful consequences of failing to face up to and correct bad policy. We have busied ourselves debating the more superficial issues. On this matter, we need to clear the air with constructive action.

Paring the issue down to its simplest terms, no case has been made that a reduction in half of our NATO forces would endanger the physical security of Western Europe. Why, it is asked in turn, should a unilateral effort to de-escalate this European garrison be rejected? I do not oppose good faith talks with the Soviets or with anyone else. Indeed, the Nelson amendment would have paved their way. But since the Soviets do have considerable independent incentive to achieve force reductions on their own, what is so necessary about moving simultaneously? Our initiative would be a reduction, not an escalation of forces. Our initiative would ease tensions, not aggravate them. Our initiative would enhance, rather than diminish, the prospects for eventual mutual troop reductions in NATO.

In summary, I would only stress again that this troop reduction amendment does not seek the end of NATO. It seeks only to reduce the size of the United States garrison in Europe. It seeks only

to bring this Nation's financial contribution to the NATO cause somewhat closer into line with that of other members.

It will not compel the complete withdrawal of the United States from Europe. Indeed, it may help to prevent it. As I see it, the current financial crisis is only the handwriting on the wall on that score. It warns that our political and military role abroad which was established in another time and circumstances is not properly adjusted to current needs.

The adjustment is long past due in Europe. Unless it is made, I fear that all of our overseas commitments—the essential, indeed, the vital—along with the superfluous, the antiquated, the irrelevant and the redundant, will be endangered.

This Government—the President and the Congress together—would be well advised in my judgment to update these commitments in concept and content. We need to look at Europe as it is, today, not as it was a quarter of a century ago, not as it was at the time of Korea when the present size of the U.S. garrison in Western Europe was first established, at which time, incidentally, we first developed an interest in Southeast Asia—specifically in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

As the Senate commences to vote on this issue, I would only ask that each Senator consider the effect of the outcome not in terms of what was right for yesterday, but rather in the context of what is needed for today and tomorrow.

Mr. President, may I say in conclusion that I have asked no Senator, not one Senator, to vote for the pending amendment; nor do I intend to do so now.

The Senate is made up of mature individuals who represent sovereign States. Each Senator is capable of making up his own mind on the basis of the issue which confronts us at this time.

As I said, I have no regrets and will have none, regardless of the outcome. I will have no alibis. I will admit no mistakes in this case. If the amendment is defeated, so be it. If otherwise, there will be no sense of personal triumph, may I emphasize. The issue has been raised, and the raising of this issue is a matter of moment for this body, for this Government, for our people, and for those of us who belong to the NATO organization.

May I say that, as far as the Senate is concerned, in my opinion, nobody is going to take us to the cleaners. If we are taken in, we will be taken in by ourselves. We will have nobody to blame but ourselves. And, if we are, it will be too bad.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields time?

MIKE MANSFIELD'S WELCOME HERESY

(By Tom Wicker)

Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana has done us all a service. His proposal to force a 50 percent reduction in American forces in Europe has made it clear how difficult it is in this country to change a policy that has achieved institutional status, no matter how little sense the policy may have come to make.

Mansfield's welcome Heresy also has exposed the extent to which American foreign policy-making is dependent, not just upon the standards and concerns but even upon the personalities of the past. For not since the Grand Army of the Republic held its last encampment has there been such an ingathering of elders and bygoners as President Nixon has mobilized in support of the proposition that NATO must never—no, never—be reconsidered like any other question of priorities.

Never mind the crumbling and festering American city; never mind the mounting demands for tax dollars for education, health, transportation, welfare, job training; never mind the cost of maintaining a half-million persons, including dependents and 128 generals, as well as 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons, in Europe; never mind the international payments deficit to which this endless commitment annually contributes \$1.8 billion.

Never mind all that; the wisdom of the ages says NATO must go on essentially untouched.

One primary argument against Mansfield's proposal is that since NATO is an alliance, the United States must not proceed unilaterally but only in concert with the other parties.

The record shows, unfortunately, that the French have pulled out, the Portuguese have their forces on duty maintaining their African empire, Britain has eliminated conscription, Canada has cut its European contingent, etc., ad infinitum. Who's unilateral? And who has borne the bulk of the load for two decades, with precious little help in sight?

The other argument is that Mansfield's proposal would sabotage any effort to follow up Brezhnev's suggestion that a reduction of forces and armaments in Europe might be negotiated by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Of course, when Brezhnev said something about like that last year, nothing came of it. And the major reason Washington seems more interested this time around is because the Brezhnev proposal provides a handy argument against Mansfield's amendment.

In fact, Nixon has made such a concerted effort—one of the most vigorous of his administration—to defeat the Mansfield amendment because of the internal power of a policy long established, particularly when those who established it are still around to defend their handiwork.

There is nothing to suggest that, before Mansfield acted, the administration had any great plans for negotiating troop reduction, either with the allies or the Soviets; and many of the patriarchs who were rushed into the breach have also opposed other movements in the glacier of East-West relations—say, Chancellor Brandt's efforts to begin Soviet-German reconciliation.

So the truth is that, far from being the disaster pictured at the White House, Mike Mansfield's amendment (which comes 26 years after World War II ended and only after he failed to stir three administrations with milder proposals) not only shown us something about the viscid sense of priority and reality in government, it may also force some action at least, even if it is defeated this week.

Having insisted that the Mansfield amendment would kill any chance to negotiate reductions with the Soviets, the administration can hardly fall now to make a serious effort to

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, immediately following my remarks, an article in yesterday's Evening Star by Tom Wicker, entitled "Mike Mansfield's Welcome Heresy."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

get such negotiations going; if it refuses to do so, or if it backs off from any effective agreement, Mansfield and his supporters will be strengthened in future demands for unilateral reductions.

As the senator says of his amendment, "if defeated, it will not be dead." That means the issue is going to be forced—which, sadly enough, is about the only way issues ever get dealt with around here, in any administration.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the Washington Post of June 20, 1969, on page 8 there is an article headed "Kissinger —" not Henry, but the Chancellor—"Urges Europe Defend Self."

Then, under a dateline from Bonn, Germany, June 19, AP, "Chancellor Kissinger told the German Congress yesterday that it is a disgrace that Americans must defend Europe." Describing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the "optimum political solution" for West Germany, Kissinger asked:

Is it not a disgrace that 200 million Americans must protect 300 million Europeans?

Mr. President, this was handed to me by a friend this morning. I had no knowledge of it before. If I had seen it in the press, I had overlooked it. Mr. President, for the past week we have heard the wailing of Cassandra from downtown, uptown, on this floor, and from overseas. We have read it in the press. We have heard it from the mouths of horses, so that we should be shaking in our boots, and we should be fearful that if we do anything, the foundations of NATO will not only be shaken, but, loosened, and finally will crumble.

Mr. President, we have listened to a considerable debate since the amendment for U.S. troop reduction in Europe was introduced. It has been an informative debate which has been interspersed with an input of additional ideas. I believe there is much sympathy with the purposes of the original amendment even as there are concerns about some of its implications. If I read the latter correctly, they have mostly to do with a possible loss of whatever opportunity for a mutual troop reduction may have been opened by the Brezhnev proposal of several days ago.

Properly, Senators are considerate of the President's constitutional prerogatives which may be involved in this matter. By the same token, however, Senators are not unaware of the constitutional responsibilities of the Senate. One of those responsibilities is to provide for the maintenance of U.S. military forces in such circumstances and only in such circumstances that the Congress may find appropriate. If I am not mistaken, most of the Members of the Senate wish to bring about a reduction in the cost and size of the U.S. deployment in Europe under NATO. I am aware that there is concern, however, lest the reduction proposed in the original amendment is too drastic and precipitous and so, upset what is certainly a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy—the North Atlantic Treaty. I stress the treaty which is fundamental to policy as distinct from NATO which is but the established military mechanism derived from the treaty 20 years ago in order to meet the situation then prevailing.

I have given a great deal of thought to the understandable concerns of Senators. I have considered and reconsidered both the perfecting amendment and the substitute amendment. It seems to me that the perfecting amendment, the Nelson amendment, as modified on yesterday, deals very effectively with the concerns. Clearly, however, it will not produce the U.S. troop reductions as promptly as the original amendment.

It is my personal judgment now as it has been for some years that the U.S. contingent in Europe ought to be reduced without delay. It ought to be reduced with or without negotiations and quite apart from considerations of the international financial situation. It is a matter of principle; in my personal judgment, these troop reductions have been desirable and are desirable now in the interests of this Nation. In my personal judgment, moreover, the cuts can be made now without doing violence in any way to our commitment to the Atlantic Treaty or the opportunities for a negotiated detente. Excess, waste or obsolescence in the U.S. troop commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, as I see it, are not bargaining chips in negotiations; they are an albatross around the neck of the Nation's basic policies.

That is my personal judgment and the original amendment was a legislative expression of that judgment. Other Members see it differently, a situation not uncommon in the processes of the Senate.

The authors of the pending perfecting amendment clearly see it differently and, therefore, they would put off a legislated cut a while longer. For the present, they would entreat the President most earnestly by this amendment to enter into negotiations with a view to mutual East-West troop reductions—a step, in any event, which there is every indication that the executive branch is now prepared to take after years of reticence. May I say that is all to the good. The advice of the Senate or the Congress in a matter of this kind is most proper in a constitutional sense; it has been offered many times to many Presidents.

What impresses me even more in the pending perfecting amendment, however, as distinct from the proposed substitute which is to come later, is that this amendment would also provide, as does the original, for legislated troop reductions, although, on a very gradual basis. Specifically, the reduction under the perfecting amendment would be to 250,000 by the end of fiscal year 1972; to 200,000 by the end of fiscal year 1973; and, finally, to 150,000 by June 30, 1974.

This provision, may I say, would be a most proper exercise of the constitutional authority of the Congress regarding maintenance of the Armed Forces. Of course, the President may disagree with the proposed approach; indeed, he may express that disapproval by veto in the end. But the responsibility is in the Congress, at this time, and specifically in the Senate. The responsibility to decide on troop reduction rests with the Senate at this point and now with the agents and drummers of the executive branch. The executive branch should no more presume to direct us in this matter than we should presume to direct the President in con-

ducting negotiations with the Soviet Union if he chooses to enter into them. And I must say that I am somewhat perturbed by the cavalier treatment of this fundamental constitutional distinction during the past few days.

In my judgment, the perfecting amendment goes far to accommodate any reasonable needs of the President in the conduct of negotiations on troop reductions. It offers to suspend the operation of the first cut in forces, and along a well-defined formula, which would otherwise be to 250,000 by June 30, 1972, if by the end of this year, negotiations are under way between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. If these talks are once begun, there will be no legislated reductions of U.S. forces whatsoever under this proposal for the next 2 years. That would not preclude the President, of course, from acting on his own to make a drawdown at any time he sees fit.

To me, Mr. President, this proposal commends itself to Senators who are prepared to see the general purposes of the troop reduction amendment realized but at a much slower pace and after still one more effort to bring off effective East-West negotiations on mutual reductions. It is an ingenious attempt to reconcile the constitutional responsibilities of the President and the Congress in a reasonable fashion.

I reiterate that the amendment does not bring about very promptly what I believe to be a most desirable adjustment in our military deployment in Europe. It does, however, go beyond the expression of a sense of the Senate which is the substance of the substitute amendment coming later and by means of which many of us thought, fruitlessly, to bring about a troop reduction in past years. The pending amendment has teeth in that it does put a legislative deadline on further Executive delays in this matter, even if the deadline is distant. I should think that its passage would not inhibit the Congress from subsequently moving up that deadline if future circumstances should so indicate.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Alabama.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, I oppose the Mansfield amendment, but I do believe that the distinguished majority leader should be given the right to have his amendment voted up or down by the Senate.

I believe that unless any amendment to the Mansfield amendment is a vast improvement over the Mansfield amendment it, too, should be rejected.

Therefore, feeling that the Nelson amendment is not an improvement on the Mansfield amendment I will oppose the Nelson amendment, as well.

The Mansfield amendment demobilizes no one; all it does is to seek the transfer of 150,000 of our soldiers. Already the number of men in the armed services is decreasing sensationally from around 3,500,000, which was the number on July 1, 1968, to around 2,700,000 now. Under the terms of the draft extension bill, the